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A TALE OF TWO (AND POSSIBLY THREE) ATKINS:
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
TWELVE YEARS AFTER THE SUPREME COURT’S
CREATION OF A CATEGORICAL BAR
John H. Blume,* Sheri Lynn Johnson,** Paul Marcus*** and Emily Paavola****
INTRODUCTION
In 2002, following a consistent trend of state legislative action prohibiting the
use of the death penalty for defendants with intellectual disability,1 the United States
Supreme Court overruled its thirteen-year-old decision of Penry v. Lynaugh.2 A major-
ity of Justices in Atkins v. Virginia3 declared a categorical exemption from capital pun-
ishment for death row inmates and capital defendants who are—in fact—persons with
intellectual disability. In doing so, the Court recognized that defendants with intellectual
disability are less culpable because they have diminished capacities to understand
and process information, to communicate, to learn from mistakes and experiences,
to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions
of others.4 The Court was also moved by the fact that defendants with intellectual
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1 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314–15 (2002) (noting a “consistency of the direction
of change”). See generally Denis W. Keyes & William J. Edwards, Mental Retardation and
the Death Penalty: Current Status of Exemption Legislation, 21 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 687, 687–96 (1997) (listing state exemptions from the death penalty for
individuals with “mental retardation” that were enacted prior to 1997).
2 492 U.S. 302 (1989); see Atkins, 536 U.S. 304 (abrogating Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302 (1989)).
3 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304, 318.
4 The Court explained:
Mentally retarded persons frequently know the difference between right
and wrong and are competent to stand trial. Because of their impairments,
however, by definition they have diminished capacities to understand and
process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and
learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses,
and to understand the reactions of others. There is no evidence that
they are more likely to engage in criminal conduct than others, but there
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disability are at a heightened risk of wrongful execution given higher incidences of
false confessions, impairments in communicating with their attorneys about facts and
details relevant to the case, difficulty testifying, and demeanors that a jury may errone-
ously interpret as lack of remorse.5
The Court defined the exemption by embracing two virtually identical and clinical
definitions then in existence—one provided by the American Association on Mental
Retardation (AAMR) (now the American Association on Intellectual and Develop-
mental Disabilities (AAIDD))6 and the other by the American Psychiatric Association
(APA) in its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR).7
The three-part clinical definitions set forth by the AAIDD and DSM-IV-TR define
intellectual disability as significantly subaverage intellectual functioning accompa-
nied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning that originated before the age of
eighteen.8 State measures for ascertaining intellectual disability, the Court suggested,
is abundant evidence that they often act on impulse rather than pursuant
to a premeditated plan, and that in group settings they are followers rather
than leaders. Their deficiencies do not warrant an exemption from crimi-
nal sanctions, but they do diminish their personal culpability.
Id. at 318 (citations omitted).
5 Id. at 305, 318, 320.
6 Id. at 308 n.3. The Atkins Court used the term “mental retardation” rather than intel-
lectual disability. See id. at 317. However, the clinical field now uses the term “intellectual
disability,” and the Supreme Court in its most recent decision addressing the issue also used the
term “intellectual disability.” See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014) (“Previous
opinions of this Court have employed the term ‘mental retardation.’ This opinion uses the
term ‘intellectual disability’ to describe the identical phenomenon.”).
7 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3 (citing APA, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 41 (4th ed. text rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]; AAMR, MENTAL
RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 5 (9th ed. 1992)
[hereinafter AAMR 9th ed.]). The AAMR 1992 definition has since been redrafted in a 2002
revision but is substantially the same. See AAMR, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION,
CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 13, 14, 17, 58 (10th ed. 2002) [hereinafter
AAMR 10th ed.]; see also AAIDD, USER’S GUIDE: MENTAL RETARDATION DEFINITION,
CLASSIFICATION AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 12 (10th ed. 2007) [hereinafter AAIDD 10th ed.].
8 The clinical definitions of intellectual disability approved in Atkins provide:
Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present function-
ing. It is characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual function-
ing, existing concurrently with related limitations in two or more of the
following applicable adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, home
living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, func-
tional academics, leisure, and work. Mental retardation manifests before
age 18.
AAMR 9th ed., supra note 7, at 1.
The essential feature of Mental Retardation is significantly subaverage
general intellectual functioning . . . that is accompanied by significant
limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of the following skill
areas: communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills,
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would be appropriate—or constitutional—so long as they “generally conformed” to
these clinical definitions.9 This suggestion led to a tremendous variation in how state
courts resolved the intellectual disability matter.10 Just last term, in Hall v. Florida,11
the Court stepped in and laid down a much clearer principle as it reaffirmed its com-
mitment to Atkins. In Hall, the Court invalidated a gloss on the definition of intellec-
tual disability adopted by the Florida Supreme Court, which had the possible effect of
rendering the categorical exclusion a “nullity” and “risk[ed] executing a person who
suffers from intellectual disability.”12
In this Article, which is in many respects a “follow-up” to the prior research in
this area by two of the authors,13 we will examine capital cases decided by the lower
courts since the Court created the categorical ban against the execution of persons with
intellectual disability.14 Twelve years after the Supreme Court’s Atkins decision, we
use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills,
work, leisure, health, and safety. . . .
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 7, at 41.
9 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3, 317 n.22 (“The statutory definitions of mental retardation
are not identical, but generally conform to the clinical definitions set forth in n. 3, supra.”).
Unfortunately, the opinion offered little guidance to state courts on the manner of enforce-
ment of its ruling. Rather, the Court stated that it would leave to the states “‘the task of
developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution
of sentences.’” Id. at 317 (alteration in original) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,
416–17 (1986)). As two of the authors have written elsewhere, this led some states to attempt
to circumvent Atkins’s mandate by embracing definitions of intellectual disability at odds
with the clinical consensus. John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn & Christopher Seeds, Of Atkins and
Men: Deviations from Clinical Definitions of Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases,
18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 689, 691 (2009) [hereinafter Blume et al., Of Atkins and Men].
10 Blume et al., Of Atkins and Men, supra note 9, at 693 (“This troubling array allows a
defendant who would be ineligible for execution in one state to be eligible for execution in
another.”).
11 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).
12 Id. at 1999, 2002. After Atkins, the Florida Supreme Court adopted a strict IQ cutoff
for Prong 1 that required a person claiming intellectual disability to have an IQ score of 70
or below. See Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 712–13 (Fla. 2007). Because Hall had an IQ
score of 71, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that as a matter of law his claim failed. Hall v.
State, 109 So. 3d 704, 707, 709 (Fla. 2012). The Supreme Court of the United States concluded
that Florida’s bright-line test was in conflict with the unanimous clinical consensus that the
standard error of measurement (+/- 5 points) in any IQ test must be taken into account, reversed
the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court, and remanded the case for additional proceedings
where Hall’s (quite strong) evidence of intellectual disability must be considered. Hall, 134
S. Ct. at 1997, 2000.
13 See John H. Blume, Sheri L. Johnson & Christopher Seeds, An Empirical Look at Atkins
v. Virginia and its Application in Capital Cases, 76 TENN. L. REV. 625 (2009) [hereinafter
Blume et al., An Empirical Look at Atkins].
14 For a look at the non-capital cases of the last twelve years considering the application
of Atkins, see Paul Marcus, Does Atkins Make a Difference In Non-capital Cases? Should It?,
23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 431 (2014).
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analyzed a number of issues including filing rates, success rates, the reasons cases
that often appear meritorious lose, differences in decisionmakers (i.e., judge versus
jury), and recent trends in intellectual disability litigation. As we will discuss in more
detail below, there are several positive trends in the lower courts. There are, how-
ever, some negative trends—some of which could, if not corrected by the Supreme
Court, bring to bear the fear articulated in Hall of effectively nullifying the High
Court’s mandate.15
I. OVERALL FILING AND SUCCESS RATES
Dissenting in Atkins, Justice Scalia maintained that exempting people with intel-
lectual disability from the death penalty would promote frivolous litigation.16 He en-
visioned a world in which defendants feigning intellectual disability would, without
penalty or risk, make spurious intellectual disability claims.17 He stated:
One need only read the definitions of mental retardation . . . to
realize that the symptoms of this condition can readily be feigned.
And whereas the capital defendant who feigns insanity risks com-
mitment to a mental institution until he can be cured (and then
tried and executed), the capital defendant who feigns mental re-
tardation risks nothing at all.18
Justice Scalia was wrong. From the time of Atkins through the end of 2013, we
identified only 371 death row inmates or capital defendants who claimed that they
could not be executed (or, in the case of pre-trial capital defendants, sentenced to
death) due to intellectual disability.19 Thus, calculating the filing rate in the manner
most generous to Justice Scalia’s floodgates concern, only approximately 7.7% of
persons whose lives could potentially be spared by a determination of intellectual
disability have raised such claims.20 This rate has also been relatively constant over
15 Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1999–2001.
16 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 337, 353–54 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
17 Id. He was joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas. Id.
18 Id. at 353 (citation omitted).
19 We gathered the data we rely upon in this Article through a variety of sources. First,
we used Westlaw searches to identify, obtain, and analyze every reported decision (whether
published or unpublished) in which a post-Atkins assertion of intellectual disability was made
in a capital case. We also posted queries on several national listservs requesting any unpub-
lished decisions and information about cases that may have been resolved without a trial or
hearing. Finally, we contacted attorneys involved in capital litigation to identify cases that
had not been discovered through the first two means.
20 There were 3,557 persons on death row at the time Atkins was decided in 2002. From
2002 through the end of 2013, another 1,262 persons were sentenced to death, providing a
total death row population of 4,819 inmates during the relevant time period. We calculated
the filing rate using 4,819 as the relevant denominator. The actual number, however, is larger
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time. The filing rate from 2002 through 2009 was also approximately 7%.21 Whether
the 7% rate is a fixed steady state is, of course, unknowable. Nevertheless, more than
a decade after the Court’s creation of the Eighth Amendment categorical bar, the
objective, empirical evidence certainly refutes Justice Scalia’s prediction. He wildly
misspoke in writing that every death row inmate and his brother would assert an in-
tellectual disability in an effort to cheat the executioner.22 The empirical evidence
also refutes any concern that significant numbers of frivolous claims would be filed.
As noted above, not only did a relatively small number of death-sentenced inmates
and capital defendants claim to be persons with intellectual disability, those who did
prevailed in a significant number of cases. The overall “success” rate, i.e., from
2002 through the end of 2013, was 55%.23 Thus, in more than half of the cases, the
(and likely substantially so) than that. Our number does not include cases in which the prose-
cution sought the death penalty but instead were resolved by plea bargain, acquittal, convic-
tion of a non-capital lesser included offense, or a life sentence imposed by jury or judge.
21 Blume et al., An Empirical Look at Atkins, supra note 13, at 628.
22 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 353. We were surprised by this finding. Not for the reasons
stated by Justice Scalia, i.e., death row inmates and their lawyers conspiring to throw sand
in what Justice Blackmun described as the “machinery of death.” Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S.
1141, 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting denial of certiorari). Rather, we expected
higher numbers because of the higher incidence of persons with intellectual disability in jails
and prisons. While only 2–3% of persons in the general population have intellectual dis-
ability, it is generally estimated that between 4–10% of persons in jail and prison have in-
tellectual disability. See Leigh Ann Davis, People with Intellectual Disabilities in the
Criminal Justice System: Victims and Suspects, THE ARC, http://www.thearc.org/document
.doc?id=3664 (last updated Aug. 2009). Thus, taking into account clear cases, close cases,
and even some hopeful cases, we anticipated that more than 7% of death row inmates and
persons facing the death penalty would seek safe harbor under Atkins. Interestingly, we were
surprised by a similar finding in the context of “competency to be executed” litigation. The
Supreme Court has also held that death row inmates who are insane or incompetent at the
time of their execution cannot be executed. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 401 (1986).
There were similar predictions after Ford that death-sentenced inmates would feign in-
competency and/or insanity to prevent their death sentences from being carried out. Of the
1,308 death-sentenced inmates who were in a procedural posture to raise a claim that they
were incompetent and/or insane and thus could not be executed, only 6.7% (87) did so. John
H. Blume, Sheri L. Johnson & Katherine Ensler, Killing the Oblivious: An Empirical Study
of Competency to be Executed Litigation, 82 UMKC L. REV. 335, 343 (2014) [hereinafter
Blume et al., Killing the Oblivious].
23 We computed the success rate by looking at cases in which the Atkins’s claim was
decided on the merits (both reported decisions and all unpublished/unreported decisions we
could locate through contacts) in all states with active death penalty regimes, but excluding
losing cases decided by a state court on direct appeal from a conviction and death sentence.
We excluded the direct appeal losses because the intellectual disability issue is not “final”
given that it may still be reviewed in state post-conviction proceedings or by the federal
courts habeas corpus proceedings. But, even including those “losses,” the overall success rate
is still 44%. We did, however, include losses in state court in state post-conviction pro-
ceedings even though the question of intellectual disability can be reviewed by the federal
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individual Atkins claimant was found to be a person with intellectual disability and
therefore not eligible for the death penalty. That is substantially higher than the rate at
which death-sentenced inmates prevail on other frequently raised claims including
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel,24 prosecutorial misconduct,25 com-
petence to stand trial,26 and other forms of legal error.27 We cannot say that there have
been no frivolous claims of intellectual disability (but as will be explained in more
detail in Part II, there do not appear to be many). Yet, it is definitely the case that,
looking at filing and success rates, Atkins has not generated a substantial amount of
litigation, much less frivolous litigation.
There was, however, some notable variation in success rates throughout the rele-
vant time period. We previously reported that the success rate from 2002 to 2008 was
approximately 40%.28 That number was accurate at the time, as we did not then have
access to the unreported and unpublished decisions contained in the current data set.
Using that same matrix, however, the success rate in the years from 2009 to 2013
declined to 26%. Using the same method of analysis (but including all known unpub-
lished decisions), we still found a change in success rates. From 2002 to 2008, the
overall success rate was 63%, and from 2009 to 2013 the rate at which persons asserting
intellectual disability declined to 43%.29
courts. We did so both to avoid objections that we were over-reporting the success rate and
because the federal courts can—under most circumstances—only reverse the state court’s
decision if it was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012). If those “losses” are not tallied because they
are not final determinations of the intellectual disability issue, the overall success rate is
70%. If only reported decisions are considered (which would definitely underrepresent the
true success rate), Atkins’s claimants still prevail at the rate of 35% (excluding direct appeal
losses), 50% (excluding direct appeal and post-conviction losses), and 26% when looking
at all merits decisions (including all losing cases still under review).
24 See generally Ty Alper, Toward a Right to Litigate Ineffective Assistance of Counsel,
70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 839, 842, 845 n.26 (2013) (discussing capital litigation and ineffec-
tive counsel).
25 See generally Richard L. Weiner & Roni Reiter-Palmon, Prosecutorial Misconduct in
Death Penalty Cases, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (June 2004), http://www.apa.org/monitor/jun04
/jn.aspx.
26 See Blume et al., Killing the Oblivious, supra note 22, at 349 (analyzing death penalty
cases in relation to individual competency claims).
27 See Andrew Gelman, James S. Liebman, Valerie West & Alexander Kiss, A Broken
System: The Persistent Patterns of Reversals of Death Sentences in the United States, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 209, 215 (2004) (discussing legal errors and the death penalty).
28 Blume et al., An Empirical Look at Atkins, supra note 13, at 628.
29 For the method of calculation, see supra note 23. The same basic pattern is observed
regardless of whether the direct appeal losses are included (50% versus 36%); or if all losses
are excluded (80% versus 54%); as well as if only reported decisions are analyzed (42%
versus 26% excluding direct appeal losses) (30% versus 21% including all losses) (66%
versus 35% excluding direct appeal and post-conviction losses).
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We cannot say with absolute certainty why there was a decrease over the last five
years in the rate at which death row inmates and capital defendants prevailed, but we
do offer several likely explanations. The first is a difference in the data sets. At the time
Atkins was decided there were people on death row or awaiting trial whose intellec-
tual disability no one disputed (or seriously disputed).30 The only matter of conten-
tion was whether there were any legal impediments to their executions.31 When the
Atkins Court created an Eighth Amendment categorical bar, there were a number of
defendants who were clearly ineligible for execution and who were removed from
death row.32 Given this reality, one would expect to see higher success rates in the
years immediately following Atkins. Second, in the post-Atkins trial cases, one would
expect fewer strong cases to be actually litigated. Undisputed or very strong evidence
of a capital defendant’s intellectual disability should—in a rational world—lead to
either withdrawal of the death notice or a negotiated settlement, i.e., plea bargain.
One would then expect in the aggregate that the case set in the post-Atkins’s trial
level prosecutions would not include as many clear cases of intellectual disability. We
do not know—and likely will never know—of all cases where an assertion of intel-
lectual disability led to a resolution of the case without a contested hearing on the
issue.33 Still, we have documented forty-six cases that “settled” due to evidence of
intellectual disability.
The third and fourth reasons we posit for the decline of the success rate over time
are potentially more nefarious. Some states modified their definitions of intellectual
disability or erected procedural obstacles intended to make it more difficult for per-
sons with intellectual disability to prevail. The two most pronounced examples are
Florida and Texas. The Sunshine State employed a strict IQ cutoff precluding a
finding of intellectual disability if the person had an IQ over 70.34 The Lonestar
State created out of non-clinical whole-cloth the so-called “Briseno factors” which
make it extraordinarily difficult to prove deficits in adaptive functioning.35 Although
last Term the Court found that Florida’s IQ cutoff frustrated the Eighth Amendment
right it created in Atkins,36 the Briseno factors and other substantive and procedural
impediments remain—for the moment at least—intact. The final reason we believe to
30 See Victor L. Streib, Adolescence, Mental Retardation, and the Death Penalty: The
Siren Call of Atkins v. Virginia, 33 N.M. L. REV. 183, 197 (2003) (stating that several hundred
death row inmates who are intellectually disabled were affected by Atkins).
31 Id.
32 See, e.g., Inmate Removed from Death Row, ABC11 EYEWITNESS NEWS (Feb. 2, 2012,
8:41 AM), http://abc11.com/archive/8528653 (showing a recent application of Atkins to
remove an inmate from death row).
33 In many such cases there would not be reported decisions on rulings that could be
located by our researchers.
34 Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 712–13 (Fla. 2007) (discussing the plain statutory rule).
35 See Blume et al., Of Atkins and Men, supra note 9, at 702–03, 711–12, 714 (discussing
the Briseno factors, their applications, and their shortcomings).
36 Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1986 (2014).
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explain the more recent downward trend is that lawyers representing the state (prose-
cuting attorneys and deputy attorneys general) have become more “sophisticated”
in their litigation strategies. We put the word “sophisticated” in quotation marks be-
cause, as will be discussed later in this Article, we observed in the cases an increased
use of stereotypes and other irrelevant considerations (e.g., behavior in prison) to
defeat strong claims that a capital defendant or death row inmate is a person with
intellectual disability.37
However, it is important in concluding this section of the Article to make two
observations. First, even the lower success rate for cases decided on the merits from
2009 through the end of 2013 is still very high. In almost half of the cases (43%) the
individual claiming intellectual disability prevailed. Second, as the title of this Article
foreshadows, if the Supreme Court of the United States is true to the spirit of its
recent decision in Hall v. Florida, it will eradicate both other substantive glosses on the
definition of intellectual disability that conflict with clear “clinical consensus” and
procedures, such as Georgia’s requirement that a person claiming intellectual disability
establish that condition “beyond a reasonable doubt,” which effectively thwarts many
cases that should prevail.38 If this occurs—and we believe it should—there will be an
“uptick” in what are already robust rates of success.
II. LOSING CASES BY PRONG
Despite the high overall rates at which persons claiming intellectual disability
prevail, there is much to be learned from a closer examination of all the capital cases
raising the issue. In this section, we will try to “unpack” cases where death row inmates
and capital defendants asserted—without success—that Atkins’s categorical bar
prevented them from being executed or sentenced to death. We do this to understand
how and why claims of intellectual disability are rejected and to identify—by contrast-
ing the losing cases with successful cases—both positive and negative trends in the
lower courts.
Is there any such thing as a “typical” rejection of a claim of intellectual disability?
Of the cases, a slight majority—approximately 52%—of all unsuccessful Atkins claim-
ants lost on all three prongs of the test for intellectual disability: (1) significantly sub-
average intellectual functioning, (2) deficits in adaptive functioning, and (3) onset
during the developmental period. In other words, in 52% of losing cases we have
identified, the reviewing court made a specific finding that the Atkins claim failed
because the individual did not make a sufficient showing that he or she met any of
these three prongs of the relevant state’s definition for intellectual disability.
That being said, approximately 31% of all unsuccessful cases were considered
a loss on Prong 1 only. In those cases, the reviewing court specifically found that the
37 See infra notes 61–79 and accompanying text.
38 Head v. Hill, 587 S.E.2d 613, 620–21 (Ga. 2003).
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claim failed because the individual asserting intellectual disability had not demon-
strated that he (or much more rarely, she) had significantly subaverage intellectual
functioning.39 In most of these cases, the decision of the court contained little or no
specific discussion of the evidence relevant to the other two prongs of the intellectual
disability criterion.40
This stands in contrast to the smaller number of cases that failed on Prong 2 alone.
Approximately 12% of the total number of unsuccessful cases were found lacking
only because the individual had not proven deficits in adaptive functioning. Even
when they did, however, the decisions typically contained a more robust discussion
of the evidence relevant to the other two prongs—particularly the individual’s intel-
lectual functioning. Approximately 71.4% of the Prong-2-only losses included a
discussion of the evidence on Prong 1, with many including findings that Prong 1
was satisfied.41
Finally, very few cases, approximately 2%, lost solely on the basis that the
person claiming intellectual disability could not demonstrate onset during the de-
velopmental period (Prong 3).42 This is not surprising, as one would expect it to be
the rare case where a person satisfied the reviewing court that he had both signifi-
cantly subaverage intellectual functioning and deficits in adaptive functioning, but
there was some etiology for the compromised intellectual and adaptive functioning
other than intellectual disability. In theory it could happen, for example, as a result
of some very serious head injury occurring after the age of eighteen, but that would
be atypical.43
We also observed that the percentage of losing cases by prong has remained
fairly consistent over time; there has been no significant shift in percentages of
losses by prong from 2002 through 2013. On the other hand, there has been a change
39 In all jurisdictions, the burden of proof—normally by a preponderance of the evi-
dence—is on the claimant.
40 Only three of the fifty-five losses on Prong 1 in our data set of reported Atkins decisions
contained any discussion about whether the claimant could satisfy Prong 2.
41 For instance, in Wood v. Allen, 542 F.3d 1281, 1286 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 525
U.S. 1042 (1998), the reviewing court found that because Prong 2 had not been satisfied—
“Wood did not have significant or substantial deficits in his adaptive functioning”—there was
no need to make a determination as to Prong 1. Having said that, however, the court also noted
that two mental health professionals “evaluated Wood together and concluded Wood[’s] . . .
full-scale IQ was 64 and his true IQ was between 61 and 69 . . . .”Id.; see also Rodgers v.
State, 948 So. 2d 655, 667 (Fla. 2006) (“As to the first prong—intellectual functioning—the
trial court found that Rodgers fell within the mild mental retardation range.”).
42 In 3% of the reported losing decisions, we were unable to determine whether the
claimant lost on Prong 1, 2, 3, or all 3 prongs.
43 For a good discussion of the difficulties with the eighteen-year-old threshold, see
Steven J. Mulroy, Execution by Accident: Evidentiary and Constitutional Problems with the
“Childhood Onset” Requirement in Atkins Claims, 37 VT. L. REV. 591 (2013).
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in average IQ scores, and how the courts handle those scores, in both winning and
losing cases over time. For cases that lost on Prong 1 only, the total average IQ score
was 78. Almost all of the claimants (94%) who lost on Prong 1 had an average IQ
score over 70, and a majority (71%) had an average IQ score over 75.44 Eighty-five
percent of claimants who lost on Prong 1 had at least one IQ score over 75, and vir-
tually all (96%) had at least one IQ score over 70. By contrast, the average IQ score
for successful cases was 68. This figure has increased from an average score of 66
in prevailing cases decided from 2002 to 2008 to an average of 69 in successful cases
decided between 2009 and 2013, indicating a slightly increased likelihood of suc-
cess with somewhat higher IQ scores as Atkins litigation has progressed in the lower
courts over the past twelve years. This is likely due to the difference in case sets in
the two time periods, as discussed previously.45 At the time of the Court’s decision in
Atkins, there were a number of people on death row who undisputedly were intellec-
tually disabled (and thus with lower average IQ’s). The majority of those cases were
resolved in the years immediately following Atkins.
Accordingly, at first blush, it may seem that the courts are generally getting it
right when it comes to the proper assessment of Prong 1, and in some cases that is
surely correct. But averages provide limited information, and a closer look at certain
cases paints a different, more troubling picture. From the pool of unsuccessful losses
on Prong 1, we identified a smaller set of cases in which the intellectual functioning
issue was not nearly so cut and dry as the deciding court viewed matters. The claim-
ants in this group lost when—in our assessment—they should have prevailed for
generally three basic reasons: (1) the cases were adjudicated in states that utilized
a strict IQ cutoff of 70 or a rebuttable presumption against a finding of intellectual
disability if the person had an IQ score over 70;46 (2) the court failed to account for
clinically accepted concepts such as the Standard Error of Measurement (SEM),47
44 By “average IQ score,” we mean that in each reported loss on Prong 1, the average of
all raw IQ scores reported in the decision exceeds 70 for 94% of claimants who lost on Prong
1, and the average raw IQ score exceeds 75 for 71% of that same pool of claimants. While
this calculation produces informative and interesting information about general trends from
a large pool of cases, we are not suggesting that an “average IQ score” is an individual person’s
“true IQ.” Nor do we think that calculating an individual’s average IQ score is necessarily
an appropriate method for making a clinical assessment of whether a person has an intel-
lectual disability.
45 See supra notes 30–34 and accompanying text.
46 See, e.g., Parrish v. Commonwealth, 272 S.W.3d 161, 168 (Ky. 2008); Cribbs v. State,
No. W2006-01381-CCA-R3-PD, 2009 WL 1905454, at *37 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 1, 2009).
47 See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1995 (2014) (“Each IQ test has a ‘standard error
of measurement,’ often referred to by the abbreviation SEM. A test’s SEM is a statistical
fact, a reflection of the inherent imprecision of the test itself. . . . The SEM reflects the reality
that an individual’s intellectual functioning cannot be reduced to a single numerical score.
For purposes of most IQ tests, the SEM means that an individual’s score is best understood
as a range of scores on either side of the recorded score.”(citation omitted)).
2014] A TALE OF TWO (AND POSSIBLY THREE) ATKINS 403
practice effects,48 or aging norms49 (sometimes referred to as the “Flynn Effect”);50 and
(3) the court credited scores derived from clinically unacceptable methods, such as
relying on short form and screening tests, making adjustments for “cultural factors” and
other types of scientifically invalid estimates.51
Phillip Elmore, who lost an Atkins claim in Ohio on Prong 1 after his counsel failed
to raise the issue of intellectual disability at trial, is a good example of a claimant not
prevailing when we believe he should have won.52 In post-conviction, Elmore offered
48 “Practice effect” refers to gains in IQ scores on tests of intelligence that result from a per-
son being retested on the same or similar test within a relatively short period of time—generally
within one year. “For this reason, established clinical practice is to avoid administering the
same intelligence test within the same year to the same individual because it will often lead
to an overestimate of the examinee’s true intelligence.” AAIDD AD HOC COMM. ON TERMINOL-
OGY & CLASSIFICATIONS, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND
SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 38 (11th ed. 2010); see also Alan S. Kaufman, Practice Effects, in
2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 828, 828–33 (Robert J. Sternberg et al. eds., 1994).
49 “[V]irtually all nations in the developed world show an upward trend in performance
on IQ tests from and after the date they are developed or ‘normed.’” United States v. Davis,
611 F. Supp. 2d 472, 485 (D. Md. 2009). Accordingly,
the population generally will achieve higher scores on IQ tests pro-
portional to the amount of time between when the test was normed and
when it was taken. . . . Standardized measures of IQ are normalized
(“normed”) on a given population such that the average, or mean, score
is 100. . . . [O]ver time, the test norms become outdated, such that the
average score is no longer 100, but something higher. . . . Corrections for
the Flynn effect adjust scores to account for the amount of time between
when the test was originally normed and when it was administered to an
individual. This allows for fair comparisons between scores obtained at
different times . . . .
Id. at 485–86; see also James R. Flynn, Tethering the Elephant: Capital Cases, IQ, and the
Flynn Effect, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 170, 174–75 (2006) (“Failure to adjust IQ scores
in the light of IQ gains over time turns eligibility for execution into a lottery—a matter of
luck about what test a school psychologist happened to administer.”).
50 See, e.g., Thomas v. Allen, 607 F.3d 749, 753 (11th Cir. 2010).
51 Henderson v. Director, No. 1:06-CV-507, 2013 WL 4811223, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 6,
2013) (stating that a State’s expert testified that the highest IQ score is the most reliable because
“‘you can’t fake knowing the answer’”); Anderson v. State, 163 S.W.3d 333, 355–56 (Ark.
2004) (relying on a ten-question questionnaire that provides an estimated IQ score, as well
as expert testimony extrapolating an estimated IQ range from scores on the Wide Range
Achievement Test (WRAT), which is not a test designed to measure IQ); State v. Were, 890
N.E.2d 263, 293 (Ohio 2008) (rejecting an Atkins claim where the defendant offered an IQ
score of 69 because of expert testimony that the test scores should be adjusted due to “cultural
bias” that tends to depress the IQ scores of minorities); Lizcano v. State, No. AP-75879, 2010
WL 1817772, at *11 (Tex. Crim. App. May 5, 2010) (stating that the State’s expert adjusted
IQ scores upward because “Hispanic test subjects historically score 7.5 points lower on IQ tests
than Caucasian subjects” due to “culture and influence” rather than cognitive deficiency).
52 State v. Elmore, No. 2005-CA-32, 2005 WL 2981797, at *7–9 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 3,
2005).
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an affidavit from an expert, Dr. Timothy Rheinscheld, who opined that Elmore’s IQ
score was 72, but that a full diagnosis could not be made without an opportunity to
assess Elmore’s adaptive skills.53 The state court declined to give Elmore that oppor-
tunity, instead granting the State’s motion for summary judgment and denying Elmore’s
petition for post-conviction relief, because an IQ score over 70 creates a rebuttable
presumption under Ohio law that a defendant is not intellectually disabled.54 The
court concluded:
Dr. Rheinscheld does not dispute that appellant’s IQ is above 70;
rather he relies on the five-point margin of error which was not
adopted by the Supreme Court in Lott. Without this five-point
margin of error, appellant would not meet the first prong of the
Atkins-Lott test. Accordingly, Dr. Rheinscheld’s affidavit adds
nothing new to the record and is based on an assumption that, while
it may be valid in the field of psychology, is not a valid factor in
assessing [intellectual disability] for an Atkins-Lott claim.55
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit found Virgilio Maldonado not to be a person with intellec-
tual disability after the State’s expert used an unqualified translator to administer the
English version of the WAIS and made upward adjustments to the score based on
“cultural and educational factors” because Maldonado is Hispanic.56
Whether an Atkins claimant can win on Prong 1 depends, of course, on the actual
scores themselves. Sometimes, however, based on our analysis of the cases, even more
attention should be given to the thoroughness and accuracy of defense expert testimony
and the particular court’s willingness to engage with and accept clinical consensus
and scientifically reliable information. It is not impossible for claimants with rela-
tively high IQ scores to succeed on an Atkins claim. Of all 49 reported decisions
finding intellectual disability, 46% of the individuals had at least one IQ score over
75, and 20% involved one or more IQ scores over 80. One of the most significant
differences between successful and unsuccessful claims on Prong 1 was the deciding
court’s acceptance of the idea that only a reliable, individually-administered, full-
scale IQ score should be considered. Many losing cases involved purportedly high IQ
scores that the court accepted at face value when clinical standards would not neces-
sarily have considered them to be a valid measure of intellectual functioning.57 On
53 Id. at *7.
54 Id. at *8–9.
55 Id. at *9 (emphasis added).
56 Maldonado v. Thaler, 625 F.3d 229, 237–38 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 552 U.S.
1298 (2008).
57 See, e.g., Esparaza v. Thaler, 408 F. App’x 787, 795 (5th Cir. 2010) (relying, in part, on
IQ scores of 86 and 88 listed on Esparaza’s penitentiary packets where no other information
was given), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2446 (2011); Cribbs v. State, No. W2006-01381-CCA-
R3-PD, 2009 WL 1905454, at *16 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 1, 2009) (focusing on a score of
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the other hand, successful claims often occurred before judges who were willing to
consider and give effect to accepted clinical standards, including, as noted previously,
the SEM, practice effect, and Flynn Effect.58 For similar reasons, claimants with high
“outlier” IQ scores fared much better when courts were willing to evaluate the totality
and quality of the available evidence relevant to the individual’s intellectual function-
ing. This is in sharp contrast with judges who mistakenly treated single IQ scores as
creating various presumptions or strict cutoff limitations.59
We now turn to losses on the adaptive deficits prong. As we previously noted,
approximately 12% of the losing claimants in the reported decisions lost on Prong 2
alone. Although most of these cases do not contain a specific finding that the claim-
ant satisfied Prong 1, many of these opinions did report the claimant’s IQ scores. These
scores typically were in the range needed to demonstrate significantly subaverage
intellectual functioning of approximately 70 on an appropriate test.60 Cases that lost
on Prong 2 generally lost based on one or more of the following factors: (1) the indi-
vidual’s prison behavior;61 (2) accusations that the individual claiming intellectual
disability is malingering;62 (3) the alleged facts of the crime;63 and (4) stereotypes of
what persons with intellectual disability can (and cannot) do.64
82 from the Ammons Picture Vocabulary test); Ex parte Hearn, 310 S.W.3d 424, 429 n.13
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (using an IQ score of 82 from a short-form test).
58 See, e.g., Holladay v. Allen, 555 F.3d 1346, 1357–58 (11th Cir. 2009); Walker v. True,
399 F.3d 315, 323 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Smith, 790 F. Supp. 2d 482, 491 (E.D.
La. 2011); United States v. Lewis, No. 1:08 CR 404, 2010 WL 5418901, at *8, *11–12 (N.D.
Ohio Dec. 23, 2010); Wiley v. Epps, 668 F. Supp. 2d 848, 893–96 (N.D. Miss. 2009);
Thomas v. Allen, 614 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1281, 1291 (N.D. Ala. 2009); United States v. Davis,
611 F. Supp. 2d 472, 475, 477 (D. Md. 2009); Green v. Johnson, No. CIVA 2:05CV340, 2006
WL 3746138, at *43–45 (E.D. Va. Dec. 15, 2006) (recognizing the Flynn effect, but rejecting
the SEM and the practice effect); Commonwealth v. Williams, 61 A.3d 979, 982–83 (Pa. 2013).
59 See, e.g., Wiley v. Epps, 625 F.3d 199, 215 (5th Cir. 2010); Thomas v. Allen, 607 F.3d
749, 757 (11th Cir. 2010); Smith, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 495–96; Hughes v. Epps, 694 F. Supp.
2d 533, 544 (N.D. Miss. 2010); Williams, 61 A.3d at 982–83.
60 See, e.g., Chester v. Thaler, 666 F.3d 340, 355 (5th Cir. 2011); Wood v. Allen, 542
F.3d 1281, 1286 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1042 (1998); Ladd v. Thaler, No.
1:03cv239, 2013 WL 593927, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2013); Ex parte Smith, No. 1080973,
2010 WL 4148528, at *3 (Ala. Oct. 22, 2010); Lane v. State, No. CR-10-1343, 2013 WL
5966905, at *6 (Ala. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2013); Lee v. State, 898 So. 2d 790, 809–10 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2003); Dufour v. State, 69 So. 3d 235, 244–45 (Fla. 2011); Rodgers v. State, 948
So. 2d 655, 667 (Fla. 2006); Rodriguez v. State, 919 So. 2d 1252, 1265 (Fla. 2005); State v.
Dunn, 41 So. 3d 454, 462–63 (La. 2010); State v. Campbell, 983 So. 2d 810, 825 (La. 2008);
Doss v. State, 19 So. 3d 690, 710 (Miss. 2009); State v. Hill, 894 N.E.2d 108, 121 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2008); State v. Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d 180, 199 (Tenn. 2013).
61 See, e.g., cases cited infra note 65.
62 See, e.g., United States v. Umana, No. 3:08cr134, 2010 WL 1052271, at *6 n.22
(W.D.N.C. Mar. 19, 2010).
63 See, e.g., Walker v. Kelly, 593 F.3d 319, 324–25 (4th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 560 U.S.
921 (2010).
64 See, e.g., id. at 326 (noting the defendant’s “ability to ingratiate himself to women and
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In Prong 2 losses, courts increasingly rely upon prison behavior in finding that
a death row inmate or capital defendant is not a person with intellectual disability. All
of the reported losses on Prong 2 from 2008 to 2012 discussed some aspect of the
claimant’s prison behavior as support for the court’s conclusion that the claimant
failed to demonstrate deficits in adaptive functioning sufficient to satisfy Prong 2.
Courts have concluded that (1) a positive adjustment to prison life; (2) employment
in prison; (3) officer testimony that the defendant was a “normal” inmate, seemed
to be of average intelligence, could communicate effectively, or was “polite” and
well groomed; (4) testimony that the prisoner was seen with books or magazines; and
(5) prison gang affiliation, all justified findings that an intellectual disability claim
failed.65 Courts have made such findings despite the fact that the clinical literature in
the field specifically advises against doing so.66 And the reasons for this admonition
are quite obvious. How an individual adjusts to the intensely structured environment
of death row is—for the most part—irrelevant to whether the person can function in
the “free world.”67 Persons on death row operate within a world where choices are ex-
tremely limited, even for such basic matters as when to get up and go to bed, what to
eat, when to shower or change clothes, and other life basics. Also, any “employment”
available to a death row inmate would be of the type that could be performed by a per-
son with intellectual disability. The same would be true with being recruited into a gang
given the gullibility of many persons with intellectual disability.68 And, it almost goes
without saying, the opinion of a correctional officer that an individual was “normal”
is the thinnest of reeds upon which to decide whether a person should live or die.69
establish intimate relationships with them in a relatively short period of time as evidence of
his social skills”).
65 See, e.g., Walker, 593 F.3d at 325–27; Umana, 2010 WL 1052271, at *5–6; Webster
v. United States, No. Civ.A. 4:00-CV-1646-, 2003 WL 23109787, at *13 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 30,
2003); State v. Hill, 894 N.E.2d 108, 124–25 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008); Ex parte Briseno, 135
S.W.3d 1, 18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
66 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 790 F. Supp. 2d 482, 517 (E.D. La. 2011) (“[T]he authors
of the ABAS-II [a standardized measure of adaptive functioning] strongly recommend against
using correctional officers as respondents . . . [because] adaptive behavior is supposed to be
assessed in a ‘real community’ where the person has to make his own choices, as opposed to a
structured prison setting, where much of the inmate’s daily life is scheduled by the institutional
staff.”). As stated in United States v. Hardy, 762 F. Supp. 2d 849, 899 (E.D. La. 2010), “An
institutional environment of any kind necessarily provides ‘hidden supports’ whereby the
inmates . . . are told when to get up, when to eat, when to bathe, and their movements are
highly restricted.”
67 See supra note 66.
68 See, e.g., Martha E. Snell et al., Characteristics and Needs of People with Intellectual
Disability Who Have Higher IQs, 47 INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 220, 226 (2009),
available at http://www.aaiddjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1352/1934-9556-47.3.220 (describing
the impact that gullibility has on individuals with intellectual disabilities).
69 Smith, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 518 (“Prison guards can hardly be expected to be able to
[determine adaptive functioning]. Furthermore, as was noted in Hardy, ‘prison officers’
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With regard to malingering, there are no formalized, reliable assessments designed
to determine whether a person is attempting to fake symptoms of intellectual dis-
ability.70 The best method for ruling out malingering is consistency in both deficits
in intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior over time.71 However, even claimants
with strong evidence of deficits in adaptive behavior and/or intellectual functioning
have lost due to accusations of malingering.72 These generally come in the form of a
prosecution expert’s subjective feeling or perception based on experience, or an opinion
based on other evidence in the case, which may or may not be reliable, such as the
defendant’s self-reported social history information.73 The facts of the crime, includ-
ing whether they demonstrate planning or deception, are often used as reasons to deny
an Atkins claim on Prong 2—particularly in Texas where the Briseno factors74 require
observations are limited to an extremely unusual set of circumstances, and are likely to be filtered
through their experience with other prisoners, many of whom may also suffer from intellec-
tual limitations.’ A further shortcoming relating to the use of prison personnel as respondents is
the bias they might have, as law enforcement officers, against a criminal . . . .” (quoting Hardy,
762 F. Supp. 2d at 900)).
70 See Allen v. Wilson, No. 1:01-cv-1658-JDT-TAB, 2012 WL 2577492, at *7 (S.D. Ind.
July 3, 2012); Smith, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 499.
71 Allen, 2012 WL 2577492, at *7; Tarver v. Thomas, No. 07-00294-CG-B, 2012 WL
4461710 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 24, 2012); Smith, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 535.
72 See, e.g., State v. Grell, 135 P.3d 696 (Ariz. 2006) (en banc) (stating one reason for height-
ened standard of review for mental retardation, by clear and convincing evidence, is because
of the legislature’s fear of malingering); State v. Strode, 232 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2007) (overruling
on appeal the trial court’s finding of mental retardation due to possible malingering).
73 See, e.g., United States v. Umana, No. 3:08cr134, 2010 WL 1052271 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 19,
2010); Doss v. State, 19 So. 3d 690 (Miss. 2009).
74 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals adopted the Briseno factors for decisionmakers
to consider when determining whether an Atkins claimant’s evidence weighs “as indicative
of mental retardation or a personality disorder[.]” Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2004). There are seven Briseno factors:
• Did those who knew the person best during the developmental
stage—his family, friends, teachers, employers, authorities—think
he was mentally retarded at that time, and, if so, act in accordance
with that determination?
• Has the person formulated plans and carried them through or is his
conduct impulsive?
• Does his conduct show leadership or does it show that he is led
around by others?
• Is his conduct in response to external stimuli rational and appropriate,
regardless of whether it is socially acceptable?
• Does he respond coherently, rationally, and on point to oral or written
questions or do his responses wander from subject to subject?
• Can the person hide facts or lie effectively in his own or others’
interests?
• Putting aside any heinousness or gruesomeness surrounding the
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the court to consider this factor as an indicator relevant to a decision on intellectual
disability.75 We can imagine situations in which the “sophistication” of the crime could
be beyond the means of a person with intellectual disability. However, most of the re-
ported decisions relying on this consideration to reject a claim of intellectual disability
do not fall in that category.76 Finally, stereotypes and general misunderstandings about
what people with intellectual disabilities can achieve are likely the most significant
factors affecting Prong 2 losses. Although people with intellectual disabilities are “often
able to perform basic life functions and tasks, such as holding jobs, driving cars, and
supporting their families,”77 many courts have relied on these factors and other ste-
reotypes to deny Atkins claims.78 Among other reasons, courts have found that the
claimant did not have deficits in adaptive functioning sufficient to satisfy Prong 2 be-
cause he (1) could read, write, and perform some rudimentary math; (2) had friends;
(3) was able to maintain his personal hygiene; (4) drove a car on occasion; (5) was ap-
propriately groomed and possessed a driver’s license; and (6) maintained relation-
ships with women.79 None of these skills or abilities are necessarily inconsistent with
intellectual disability.
And finally, we look at losses on Prong 3 (onset during the developmental period).
Very few persons raising claims of intellectual disability lose on Prong 3 alone; in
fact, we were only able to identify three cases appropriately classified as a loss on
capital offense, did the commission of that offense require fore-
thought, planning, and complex execution of purpose?
Id. at 8–9.
75 See, e.g., Matamoros v. Thaler, No. H-07-2613, 2010 WL 1404368 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31,
2010); Chester v. Quarterman, No. 505cv29, 2008 WL 1924245 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 2008);
Hodges v. State, 55 So. 3d 515, 526 (Fla. 2010); State v. Dunn, 41 So. 3d 454, 458–59 (La.
2010).
76 Compare State v. Vela, 777 N.W.2d 266 (Neb. 2010) (finding that the defendant failed
on Prong 2 because of his job and relationships), with United States v. Jiménez-Benceví, 934
F. Supp. 2d 360 (D.P.R. 2013) (finding that the defendant failed on Prong 2 because of the
sophistication of the crime).
77 Wiley v. Epps, 625 F.3d 199, 203, 204 (5th Cir. 2010); see also DSM-IV-TR, supra
note 7, at 151 (stating that people with mental retardation may “be able to live independently”
and “[d]ocumented successful outcomes of individuals with appropriate supports contrasts
sharply with incorrect stereotypes that these individuals never have friends, jobs, spouses, or chil-
dren”); id. at 46 (“There are no specific physical features associated with Mental Retardation”);
id. at 43 (people with mild mental retardation “can acquire academic skills up to approxi-
mately the sixth-grade level[,]” “have minimal impairment in sensorimotor areas, . . . often
are not distinguishable from children without Mental Retardation until a later age[,]” and
“usually achieve . . . vocational skills” and even successfully live independently).
78 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, Criminal No. 06-00079 JMS-KSC, 2014 WL
869217 (D. Haw. Mar. 6, 2014) (rejecting defendant’s claim because he functioned “normally”
in the “real world”).
79 See Walker v. Kelly, 593 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 2010); Lane v. State, No. CR-10-1343, 2013
WL 5966905 (Ala. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2013); Dufour v. State, 69 So. 3d 235 (Fla. 2011);
State v. Campbell, 983 So. 2d 810 (La. 2008); Branch v. State, 961 So. 2d 659 (Miss. 2007).
2014] A TALE OF TWO (AND POSSIBLY THREE) ATKINS 409
Prong 3 only. Ohio death row inmate Michael Stallings presented evidence of two
IQ scores of 76, one obtained at age sixteen and another post-crime.80 Stallings’s expert
testified that both of these scores were inflated due to the out-of-date testing instruments
used.81 Based on these scores and the score of an adaptive functioning scale adminis-
tered while Stallings was in prison, his expert concluded that he satisfied the first two
prongs of intellectual disability.82 The expert waivered, however, on the third prong be-
cause Stallings was never specifically evaluated for intellectual disability prior to age
18.83 A second expert, who was originally retained by the state, agreed with Stallings’s
expert and ultimately opined that it was more likely than not that Stallings satisfied all
three prongs of Ohio’s definition of intellectual disability.84 The state court rejected the
expert testimony, however, finding that Stallings failed to rebut Ohio’s presumption that
he was not intellectually disabled because he had an IQ score above 70.85 Although
Stallings had proven both Prongs 1 and 2, the court concluded that he had not proven
that it was more likely than not that his condition began prior to age 18 as required by
the criteria for Prong 3.86
III. VARIATION
Aggregated filing and success rates conceal great variation. Both the identity of
the decisionmaker—judge or jury—and the state in which the claim is brought power-
fully influence the likelihood that an Atkins claim will succeed.
A. Variation by Decisionmaker
As noted above, Atkins “le[ft] to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate
ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.”87
80 Stallings v. Bagley, 561 F. Supp. 2d 821 (N.D. Ohio 2008).
81 Id. at 881.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 881–82.
84 Id. at 882–83.
85 Id. at 883.
86 Id. at 883–84; see also Commonwealth v. Vandivner, 962 A.2d 1170, 1186 (Pa. 2009)
(finding defendant failed to satisfy Prong 3 because there were no IQ scores from his child-
hood and no evidence that he was placed in special education classes as a result of intellec-
tual disability); Williams v. Cahill, 303 P.3d 532 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) (affirming the lower
court’s finding that although Williams’s current IQ was significantly subaverage, his IQ was
likely higher now than at age 18 due to substance abuse and worsening mental illness). The
reported decisions also contain one “Reverse Prong 3” loss. In a decision that appears to be
one of a kind, the Ohio Court of Appeals found that Andre Williams satisfied all three prongs
prior to the age of 18, but nonetheless failed to win his Atkins claim because he could not
show “‘substantial limitations in present functioning,’” as required by Ohio law. State v.
Williams, No. 2007-T-0105, 2008 WL 2582849, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) (quoting State
v. White, 885 N.E.2d 905, 907 (Ohio 2008)).
87 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002) (alterations in original) (quoting Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405, 416–17 (1986)).
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Consequently, each state had to make a variety of decisions concerning the imple-
mentation of the Atkins ban, including the identity of the decisionmaker, the timing of
the eligibility determination, and the allocation of the burden of proof.88 For pre-
Atkins cases—cases where a death sentence had already been imposed when Atkins was
decided—all states elected to have a judge make the determination.89 Thus our earlier
data, comprised almost entirely of post-verdict remands, gave us no opportunity to
consider differences between judge and jury determinations of intellectual disability.
Given the cost of impaneling a jury, as well as the greater likelihood of reversible
error inherent in a jury proceeding, this unanimous choice was not surprising. In the
post-Atkins cases, one would expect that efficiency considerations would still have
weighed against jury determinations; a judicial determination of intellectual disability
would have obviated the need for impaneling a jury, or at least permitted the impan-
eling of a non-capital jury—a much less costly process. Nonetheless, ten states—
Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia—chose to allocate the determination of intellec-
tual disability in the post-Atkins cases to juries.90 In addition, California permits the
defendant to elect a judge or jury.91 South Carolina provides for an initial judicial
determination and, in the event of a finding of no intellectual disability, permits the
defendant to submit the issue to the jury as well.92
If the state legislatures that chose jury determinations did so believing that juries
would be more reluctant to find intellectual disability, it appears that they guessed right.
From 2002 to 2014 there have been 23 jury determinations of intellectual disability,
and in 22 of those cases, or 96%, the jury determined that the defendant did not have
intellectual disability. The contrast between this rate and the overall success rate—
43%—is striking. Although it is possible that intellectual disability claims presented
to juries vary in some systematic way from those presented to judges, we have no
hypothesis as to why this should be so. Perhaps, however, a comparison of the suc-
cess rate in jury cases in the more recent period—post-2008—is more appropriate than
a comparison to the overall rate for all Atkins cases, given that most jury determinations
occurred in that stretch. Moreover, as discussed above, one would expect that suc-
cess rates between pre- and post-Atkins cases would differ because some of the pre-
Atkins cases are ones that were so strong they would have been settled had they been
decided after Atkins—and the set of judge cases (unlike the set of jury cases) include
88 See, e.g., Franklin v. Maynard, 588 S.E.2d 604, 606 (S.C. 2003).
89 Id.
90 See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45(a) (1975); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618(d)(2)(B)(i) (1993);
LA. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5.1 (2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-2005(e)
(2001); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.106(E) (2006); PA. R. CRIM. P. 844(B); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-264.3:1.1(C) (2003); Rogers v. State, 653 S.E.2d 31 (Ga. 2007); State v. Flores, 93
P.3d 1264 (N.M. 2004); Williams v. State, 270 S.W.3d 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
91 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376(b)(1) (West 2003).
92 Franklin, 588 S.E.2d at 606.
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some of those “would-have-settled” cases. But even if jury cases are compared to
all post-2008 cases, a huge discrepancy in success rates remains: 26% versus 4%.93
While the perfect comparison is not obvious, any way we slice it, juries seem to be
vastly harsher in their evaluation of intellectual disability claims than are judges.
This is an interesting finding because other comparisons of judge and jury decision-
making have found that juries tend toward greater leniency.94 Prior empirical studies
find great judge-juror agreement in both civil and criminal trials, and that when dis-
agreement does occur in criminal cases, juries are likely to be more lenient.95 Senten-
cing in capital cases follows the pattern of greater jury lenience, but the disparity is
much more pronounced.96
Perhaps juries are more lenient than judges in ordinary guilt and sentencing
determinations but harsher in determinations of intellectual disability because—in
the context of a horrible crime—judges are more able to set aside their feelings and
correctly apply a legal standard than jurors. Another factor may be the timing of the
decision; juries determine intellectual disability after hearing all of the evidence in
aggravation, including victim impact evidence as compared to judges, who generally
make pretrial rulings of intellectual disability and consequently have been exposed to
93 A comparison to overall success rates during the later period can also be criticized.
Because overall success rates reflect both the initial decisionmaker’s determination and sub-
sequent reversals, it could be argued that the overall success rate overstates the willingness
of judges to find intellectual disability. Yet a comparison limited to initial decisions is also
an “apples and oranges” comparison because our review shows that jury decisions are amaz-
ingly invincible on appeal and judge decisions are not; we have only encountered two jury
determinations of no intellectual disability that have been reversed on appeal. See Lambert
v. State, 126 P.3d 6646 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005); Pickens v. State, 126 P.3d 612 (Okla. Crim.
App. 2005).
94 See, e.g., Valerie P. Hans, Judges, Juries, and Scientific Evidence, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 19,
22–23 (2007).
95 See NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 148–51 (2007);
see also Theodore Eisenberg et al., Judge-Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases: A Partial Repli-
cation of Kalven & Zeisel’s The American Jury, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 171, 173 (2005);
Hans, supra note 94, at 22–23; Valerie P. Hans et al., The Hung Jury: The American Jury’s
Insights and Contemporary Understanding, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 33 (2003); Valerie P. Hans,
What Difference Do Juries Make?, in EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF JUDICIAL SYSTEMS 105 (K.C.
Huang ed., 2009).
96 See Michael Radelet, Overriding Jury Sentencing Recommendations in Florida Capital
Cases: An Update and Possible Half-Requiem, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 793, 828–33 (2011)
(reporting 166 judicial overrides of jury life sentences in Florida); see also Judicial Override
in Alabama, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (Mar. 2008), http://www.eji.org/files/03.19.08%20
Judicial%20Override%20Fact%20Sheet_0.pdf (“Since the death penalty was reinstated in
1976, Alabama judges have overridden 84 cases from life to death. In the same period, judges
overruled death verdicts to life sentences in only a handful of cases. Of the 198 prisoners
currently on Alabama’s death row, 40 (20%) were condemned to death by a judge who threw
out the jury’s decision that death was not the appropriate punishment.” (emphasis omitted)).
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fewer emotional, retributive triggers.97 Regardless of the reason, it is obvious that jurors
are vastly more reluctant to find intellectual disability than are judges.
B. Variation by State
In an earlier article, two of the authors found substantial variation by state, citing
as an example the success rate in North Carolina—about 80%—as compared to that of
Alabama—about 12%.98 We observed that this disparity “corresponds with the avail-
ability of funding for post-conviction litigation” which is minimal in Alabama and
adequate in North Carolina.99 We also looked at the restrictiveness of the applicable
definition of intellectual disability, in that Alabama (unlike North Carolina) “applies
a strict IQ cutoff and assesses adaptive functioning deficits by focusing on what the
claimant can do rather than focusing, as those clinical definitions require, on the
individual’s limitations.”100
The table below reflects all of the win-loss data as of the end of 2013,101 and it
reveals that the disparities we observed earlier were not transitory:
State
Claims Decided
On Merits
Merit
Wins
Merit
Losses
Alabama 34 5 29
Arizona 11 5 6
Arkansas 4 1 3
California 5 2 3
Colorado 4 3 1
Florida 24 0 24
Georgia 9 1 8
Idaho 1 0 1
Illinois 0 0 0
97 See, e.g., Franklin, 588 S.E.2d at 606 (detailing procedural process for post-Atkins
mental retardation cases in South Carolina).
98 Blume et al., An Empirical Look at Atkins, supra note 13, at 629.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 This table reflects the current status of all cases by state, regardless of what stage of
litigation the case is now in. Overall success rates would rise in most states if we counted only
the cases that are final as “losses.” As discussed in the Introduction, any method of determin-
ing success rates has its disadvantages, but for the purpose of examining variation by state,
we thought it was most instructive to include the largest set of cases possible.
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Indiana 6 2 4
Kentucky 9 1 8
Louisiana 11 4 7
Mississippi 14 8 6
Missouri 6 3 3
Nebraska 1 0 1
Nevada 2 1 1
New Jersey 1 0 1
New Mexico 0 0 0
New York 0 0 0
North Carolina 34 28 6
Ohio 20 5 15
Oklahoma 10 3 7
Oregon 1 0 1
Pennsylvania 16 10 6
South Carolina 6 5 1
Tennessee 8 0 8
Texas 45 8 37
Utah 2 1 1
Virginia 7 0 7
Federal DP 12 4 8
Military 1 0 1
Total 304 100 204
Of course, some of the jurisdictions have so few cases that the success rate is not
meaningful; Oregon’s 0% success rate cannot profitably be compared to anything,
given that it is derived from one case. On the other hand, 24 cases have been litigated
in Florida, and through 2013, the claimant lost in every single one of those cases.102 The
success rates in Alabama (5 out of 34), Georgia (1 out of 9), Kentucky (1 out of 9),
Tennessee (0 out of 8), Texas (8 out of 45), and Virginia (0 out of 7) are also strikingly
102 As discussed earlier, in 2014, the Supreme Court reversed Hall’s conviction in its case,
Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014), improving Florida’s success rate to 1 in 24.
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low. In contrast, the North and South Carolina rates (28 out of 34 and 5 out 6, respec-
tively) are strikingly high.
Our additional data not only confirms the jurisdictional variation we saw in the ear-
lier cases, but also aligns with procedural and substantive differences in the state
system. Rates are lower in states with substantive deviations from clinical definitions.
Florida and Alabama are in that category, as both of them (prior to Hall) adhered to an
IQ cutoff.103 Texas also deviates greatly, having adopted its own idiosyncratic approach
to adaptive functioning.104 And Georgia, too, is an oddity, as it requires proof of intel-
lectual disability beyond a reasonable doubt.105
CONCLUSION
We have told a tale of two Atkins: the first tale was one of extraordinary success
rates, with deviations from a few states beginning to appear; the second tale is one born
of the first—some states attempt, either through procedural obstacles or substantive
deviations, to eviscerate the holding of Atkins, while others grow in their own commit-
ment to understanding and enforcing clinical norms. Meanwhile, the litigants grow
in sophistication.
The third Atkins tale has yet to unfold. Now that the Supreme Court in Hall v.
Florida has prohibited a rigid IQ cutoff, it remains to be seen whether parallel devia-
tions from the second prong, adaptive functioning, will be likewise disciplined.106
Hall was not yet a month old when the Fifth Circuit declared that it had no effect on
Texas’s gross deviations from clinical definitions of adaptive functioning.107 If the
Supreme Court is committed to equal enforcement of Atkins, it will need to respond to
adaptive functioning deviations from clinical definitions and to procedural barriers,
such as jury determinations and prohibitive burdens of proof, to its realization. And
by “need to respond”, we mean the Court ought to strike down as unconstitutional such
deviations and barriers.
103 Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1986; Morris v. State, 60 So. 3d 326 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010).
104 Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8–9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (instructing a focus upon
factors related to the crime and perceptions of the defendant by lay persons).
105 Head v. Hill, 587 S.E.2d 613 (Ga. 2013).
106 Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1986.
107 Mays v. Stephens, 757 F.3d 211, 219 (5th Cir. 2014).
